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Abstract:	
	This	paper	is	about	whether	shifts	in	attention	can	alter	what	it	is	like	to	think.	I	begin	by	taking	 up	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 attention	 structures	 consciousness	 into	 a	 centre	 and	 a	periphery,	 following	Watzl’s	 (2014,	 2017)	 understanding	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	centre	and	periphery	of	the	field	of	consciousness.	Then	I	show	that	introspection	leads	to	divided	results	about	whether	attention	structures	conscious	 thought	 into	a	centre	and	a	periphery	 –	 remarks	 by	 Martin	 (1997)	 and	 Phillips	 (2012)	 suggest	 a	 negative	 answer,	whereas	remarks	by	Maher	(1923)	and	Chudnoff	(2013)	suggest	a	positive	answer.	Lastly,	I	argue	that	there	is	behavioral	evidence	that	lends	weight	to	the	“yes”	side	of	the	introspective	dispute.	My	argument	makes	use	of	Garavan’s	(1998)	study	of	forming	and	maintaining	two	mental	counts	at	once.						
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Introduction1	
	We	can	ask	a	wide	variety	of	interesting	questions	about	the	relationship	between	perceptual	attention	 and	perceptual	 consciousness.	 	 For	 example,	we	 can	 ask	whether	 directing	 our	perceptual	attention	towards	an	object	can	cause	our	perceptual	consciousness	of	the	object	to	 change	 in	 certain	 distinctive	 ways.2	 According	 to	 William	 James,	 the	 answer	 to	 that	question	is	“yes”.	Here	is	his	description	of	the	way	that	perceptual	attention	seems	to	alter	perceptual	consciousness:			 …	it	must	be	admitted	that	to	some	extent	the	relative	intensity	of	two	sensations	may	be	changed	when	one	of	them	is	attended	to	and	the	other	is	not...	in	listening	for	certain	notes	in	a	chord,	the	one	we	attend	to	sounds	probably	a	little	more	loud	...	(James	1890	p.	425).			According	 to	Gustav	Fechner,	however,	 the	answer	 is	 “no”.	Here	 is	his	description	of	 the	phenomenology	of	conscious	perceptual	attention:		 A	gray	paper	appears	to	us	no	lighter,	the	pendulum-beat	of	a	clock	no	louder,	no	matter	how	much	we	increase	the	strain	of	our	attention	upon	them	(in	James	1890	p.	426).3		A	great	deal	of	recent	work	in	philosophy,	psychology,	and	neuroscience	has	increased	our	understanding	of	their	dispute.4	However,	I	think	that	this	recent	work	has	mostly	neglected	
																																																						1	For	comments	on	this	paper,	and/or	earlier	work	that	this	paper	is	based	on,	thanks	to:	Ben	Bronner,	Diana	Raffman,	 Eli	 Shupe,	 Gurpreet	 Rattan,	 Jill	 Cumby,	 Luke	 Roelofs,	 Nate	 Charlow,	Wayne	Wu,	William	 Seager,	Zachary	Irving,	and	two	anonymous	referees	for	this	journal.		
	2	 Throughout,	 I	 will	 use	 “consciousness”	 to	 refer	 to	 phenomenal	 consciousness	 rather	 than	 access	consciousness	(see	Block	1995	for	this	distinction).			3	I	follow	Watzl	(forthcoming)	in	thinking	that	juxtaposing	these	two	quotations	is	a	useful	way	of	introducing	debates	about	how	best	to	characterize	the	phenomenology	of	attending.		
	4	See	Wu	2014	Chapter	4	for	a	recent	review	of	some	of	these	developments	(as	well	as	positive	contributions).			
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a	closely	related	and	very	interesting	question.	The	question	is	whether	the	cognitive	kind	of	attention	-	what	William	James	called	“intellectual	attention”	-	can	alter	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition	(James	1890	p.	419).5				 In	this	paper,	I	will	answer	that	question	positively.	In	particular,	I	will	argue	that,	
contra	Michael	Martin	(1997)	and	Ian	Phillps	(2012),	shifts	in	intellectual	attention	can	cause	some	cognitive	experiences	to	become	more	central	than	others	in	the	field	of	consciousness.	In	 so	 doing,	 I	will	move	 beyond	merely	 introspective	 considerations,	which	 are	 the	 only	considerations	 taken	 into	 account	 by	 Martin	 and	 Phillips,	 and	 bring	 some	 behavioral	evidence	to	bear	on	the	question.	My	argument	makes	use	of	Hugh	Garavan’s	(1998)	study	of	forming	and	maintaining	two	mental	counts	at	once.	On	my	view,	his	study	shows	that	we	can	 consciously	 and	 attentively	 think	 of	 one	 count	 while	 consciously	 and	 inattentively	thinking	of	another	count.	Paired	with	the	assumption	that	it’s	in	virtue	of	the	attentive	mode	of	thought	that	an	experience	becomes	more	central	in	the	field	of	consciousness	than	other	experiences	(which	I	defend	in	the	final	section	of	the	paper),	this	result	lends	some	weight	to	the	claim	that	attention	can	alter	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition.				 In	 distinguishing	 between	 perceptual	 kinds	 of	 processing	 and	 cognitive	 kinds	 of	processing,	I	use	“cognitive”	to	refer	to	the	non-perceptual	kind	of	mental	processing,	and	not	 in	the	broader	way	that	 it	 is	used	when	we	say	something	 like	“the	subject	matter	of	cognitive	 science”.	 Clearly,	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 cognitive	 science	 includes	 perceptual	processing	 as	 well	 as	 (e.g.)	 memorial	 processing.	 But	 there	 is	 also	 a	 narrower	 use	 of	“cognitive”.	 Paradigm	 cases	 of	 this	 narrower	 kind	 of	 cognition	 include	 deliberation,	judgment,	and	memory.				 There	is	a	hard	question	to	ask	about	how	to	precisely	mark	the	boundary	between	perception	and	this	narrower	kind	of	cognition.	In	what	follows,	by	“cognitive”,	I	will	mean	“stimulus-independent”	(See	Camp	2009,	Burge	2010	p.	378,	Beck	2012	p.	586,	and	Beck	
																																																						
5	 Recently,	 “internal”	 and	 “reflective”	 have	 become	 more	 popular	 terms	 than	 “intellectual”,	 but	 the	psychologists	using	these	terms	say	explicitly	that	they	intend	to	mark	the	same	distinction	that	James	did	(see,	e.g.	Chun,	Golomb,	and	Turk-Browne	2011	p.	77	and	Backer	and	Alain	2014	p.	439).	
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2017	for	discussion	and/or	refinement	of	this	way	of	marking	off	cognitive	processing	from	perceptual	processing).	A	stimulus-independent	mental	representation	does	not	require	an	active	causal	link	with	the	object	that	it	is	about	to	continue	existing.	A	visual	representation	of	 an	 apple	 is,	 therefore,	 stimulus-dependent,	 while	 a	 memory	 of	 an	 apple	 is	 stimulus-independent.			 Note	that	such	a	cognitive	representation	of	the	apple	is,	in	a	sense,	dependent	on	the	apple.	But	the	sense	in	which	it	is	dependent	on	the	apple	is	attenuated	and	unimportant	for	our	purposes	here.	You	can’t	have	a	memory	of	an	apple	without	having	perceived	the	apple	first,	and	this	is	the	sense	in	which	many	cognitive	representations	ultimately	do	depend	for	their	 existence	 on	 a	 stimulus.	 But	 the	 cognitive	 representation	 does	 not	 depend	 for	 its	existence,	in	a	moment-to-moment	way,	on	an	active	causal	connection	with	the	apple.	That	is	the	sense	in	which	the	cognitive	representation	is	stimulus-independent.			 With	those	remarks	about	cognition	on	hand	we	can	move	on	to	asking	my	question	about	 intellectual	 attention	 and	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 conscious	 cognition.	 Just	 as	 it	 is	plausible	 to	 assume	 that	 there	 is	 often	 something	 it	 is	 like	 to	 perceive,	 it	 is	 plausible	 to	assume	that	there	is	often	something	it	is	like	to	engage	in	cognition.	6		Declan	Smithies	has	helpfully	 provided	 the	 following	 list	 of	 examples	 of	 cognition	 that	 seem	 phenomenally	conscious:		
• Considering	a	hypothesis	
• Judging	that	a	hypothesis	is	true	
• Recalling	a	fact	learned	in	the	past	
• Recognizing	that	the	conclusion	of	an	argument	follows	from	its	premises	
• Inferring	the	conclusion	of	an	argument	from	its	premises	
• Drifting	aimlessly	in	thought		
																																																						6	Note	also	that	to	say	that	there	is	conscious	thought	is	not	to	make	the	presumption	that	there	is	a	sui	generis	phenomenology	of	thought	(see	Pitt	2004	for	a	defense	of	such	a	view	and	Tye	&	Wright	2010	for	a	criticism	of	such	a	view).	It	is	just	to	say	that	sometimes	there	is	something	it	is	like	to	engage	in	a	cognitive	process.		
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• Calculating	the	solution	to	a	problem	
• Deliberating	about	what	to	do	
• Grasping	a	metaphor	
• Getting	a	joke	
• Understanding	a	sentence	
• Having	an	unarticulated	thought	on	the	tip	of	your	tongue	
• Feeling	confident,	or	certain,	or	doubtful,	or	incredulous	
• Having	a	suspicion	or	a	hunch	(Smithies	2013	p.	2)	Once	this	plausible	assumption	about	cognition	has	been	made	salient,	it	should	be	obvious	that	we	can	ask	some	interesting	questions	about	the	way	that	attention	can	alter	these	kinds	of	experiences,	and	not	just	the	perceptual	kinds	of	experiences.7			 In	the	rest	of	this	paper	I	aim	to	address	one	of	those	interesting	questions	–	whether	shifts	in	intellectual	attention	can	cause	some	thoughts	to	become	more	central	in	the	field	of	 consciousness	 than	other	 thoughts.	 First,	 I	 articulate	my	question	 about	 attention	 and	consciousness	a	bit	more	clearly,	and	design	a	method	to	answer	it	grounded	in	Sebastian	Watzl’s	(2014,	2017)	understanding	of	the	distinction	between	“centre”	and	“periphery”	in	the	 field	 of	 consciousness.	 Next,	 I	 show	 that	 using	 this	 method,	 which	 is	 grounded	 in	introspection,	leads	to	conflicting	results.	Finally,	I	introduce	some	behavioral	evidence	to	help	us	move	past	the	introspective	deadlock.	The	evidence	in	question	is	Hugh	Garavan’s	(1998)	examination	of	what	happens	when	we	try	to	simultaneously	form	and	maintain	two	
																																																						7	This	list	of	mental	processes	is	meant	to	give	a	rough	idea	of	the	kind	of	process	that	I	am	referring	to	when	I	talk	 about	 stimulus-independent	mental	 processing.	 One	 consequence	 of	 thinking	 of	 cognition	 in	 terms	 of	stimulus	 independence	 is	 that	 it	 categorizes	 the	 imagination	 as	 cognitive	 rather	 than	 perceptual,	 although	Smithies	himself	does	not	assert	that	imagination	is	a	cognitive	process.	This	way	of	thinking	about	cognition	seems	to	be	presupposed	by	psychologists	and	philosophers	in	the	recent	literature	on	cognitive	penetration	and,	 more	 broadly,	 the	 demarcation	 between	 perception	 and	 cognition.	 Fiona	 MacPherson,	 for	 example,	explicitly	 categorizes	 the	 mental	 states	 we	 occupy	 while	 imagining,	 dreaming,	 and	 hallucinating	 as	 non-perceptual	(i.e.,	presumably	cognitive)	mental	states	(Macpherson	2012	pp	50-51).	On	this	way	of	thinking,	stimulus-independence	 is	 more	 important	 than	 phenomenal	 similarity	 or	 relatedness	 when	 it	 comes	 to	marking	 the	divide	between	perception	 and	 cognition.	This	 approach	 seems	 to	be	 shared	by	psychologists	including	Chun,	Golomb,	and	Turk-Browne	(2011)	and	Backer	and	Alain	(2014).		.				
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mental	counts	at	once.	My	analysis	of	the	evidence,	I	argue,	gives	us	new,	additional	reason	to	think	that	intellectual	attention	can	alter	the	structure	of	conscious	cognition.		
§1.	What	does	it	mean	for	attention	to	alter	consciousness?	
	“There	 are	 at	 least	 two	ways	 to	understand	 the	question	of	whether	 a	particular	kind	of	attention	alters	consciousness.	The	first	way,	as	we	saw	in	the	disagreement	between	James	and	Fechner	above,	 amounted	 to	a	question	about	whether	attention	alters	 the	apparent	qualities	of	 stimuli,	 like	 intensity	or	 loudness.	 In	 the	perceptual	 case,	 James	and	Fechner	seem	to	come	to	different	introspective	judgments	about	how	to	answer	the	question.		But	 there	 is	 also	 a	 second	 way	 of	 understanding	 the	 question	 about	 whether	 a	particular	kind	of	attention	alters	consciousness.	This	second	way	amounts	 to	a	question	about	whether	attention	alters	the	relations	that	hold	between	particular	experiences,	rather	than	the	individual	experiences	themselves.	For	example,	when	we	shift	our	visual	attention	to	different	crosses	on	the	figure	below,	while	our	gazes	remain	fixed	on	the	centre	cross,	our	experiences	of	some	of	the	crosses	seem	to	become	more	peripheral	(or	backgrounded)	than	others:			,	 		 							According	to	Christopher	Mole,	the	introspective	verdict	about	how	to	describe	cases	like	this	one	is	less	contentious	than	the	introspective	verdict	about	the	non-structural	question	about	phenomenology	that	James	and	Fechner	were	arguing	about	(2008	pp.	88-89).	On	his	
Figure	1:	Three	crosses	
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view,	most	people	think	that	as	we	shift	our	perceptual	attention	from	one	cross	to	another,	while	keeping	our	gaze	 fixed	on	the	centre	cross,	perceptual	attention	does	seem	to	alter	perceptual	consciousness,	in	this	structural	sense.8			 Whether	 there	 is	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 ways	 we	 must	 answer	 these	 two	questions	about	attention	and	consciousness	is	itself	an	open	and	interesting	question	(i.e.,	the	structural	question	and	then	non-structural	question).	It	might,	for	example,	be	the	case	that	the	facts	about	the	structure	of	consciousness	can	explain	the	facts	about	which	objects	are	presented	as	having	certain	properties	to	a	certain	degree,	or	vice	versa,	or	it	might	be	that	these	sets	of	facts	are	independent	of	each	other.			 		 In	this	paper	I	restrict	the	scope	of	my	investigation	to	just	one	of	those	questions:	the	question	of	whether	intellectual	attention	can	alter	conscious	cognition	in	a	structural	way.	I	 leave	 open	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 intellectual	 attention	 to	 an	 object	 can	 alter	 what	properties	 the	 object	 seems	 to	 have,	 and	 and	 I	 leave	 open	 the	 question	 of	 what	 the	relationship	between	our	answers	to	those	two	questions	might	be.			 		 But	 before	 going	 on	 to	 actually	 answer	 the	 structural	 question	 about	 intellectual	attention	and	consciousness,	I’ll	discuss	in	some	more	depth	what	I	mean	when	I	say	that	attention	might	alter	the	structural	features	of	consciousness.			
§1.1	What	is	phenomenal	structure?	
	 		 A	stream	of	consciousness,	as	I	use	the	term,	is	a	temporally	extended	experience	that	is	itself	composed	of	experiences.	For	example,	the	experience	of	writing	a	paper	in	a	cafe	might	be	composed	of	the	experience	of	feeling	the	seat	beneath	oneself,	the	experience	of	tasting	coffee,	the	experience	of	coming	to	various	conclusions	about	what	to	write	next,	etc.	Total	 conscious	 states	 are	 sets	 of	 experiences	 that	 are	 all	 a	 part	 of	 the	 same	 stream	 of	
																																																						8	See,	however,	De	Brigarde	(2010)	and	Wu	(2014)	for	criticism	–	I	address	Wu’s	method	of	criticism	in	more	depth	at	the	end	of	the	paper.		
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consciousness	and	that	all	occur	at	the	same	moment.	9	A	total	conscious	state	that	is	a	part	of	the	temporally	extended	experience	of	writing	a	paper	in	a	café,	for	example,	might	involve	simultaneously	making	a	judgment	about	an	argument	and	hearing	some	music.	 			 Sebastian	Watzl	(2014,	2017),	among	others,	has	argued	that	consciousness	is	aptly	described	as	a	“field”	of	experiences,	and	that	the	field	has	“structure”.	To	be	more	precise,	what	he	seems	 to	mean	 is	 that	 total	 conscious	 states	 are	aptly	described	as	 field-like.	For	example,	on	this	sort	of	view,	when	you’re	sitting	in	an	audience	in	front	of	an	orchestra	your	field	of	experiences	will	probably	include	a	visual	experience	of	the	members	of	the	orchestra	and	an	auditory	experience	of	the	piece	that	they	are	playing.				 Moreover,	many	of	these	philosophers	seem	to	think	that	the	field	of	experiences	has	at	least	two	parts	–	a	“centre”	and	a	“periphery”.	On	this	way	of	thinking,	one	experience,	or	small	group	of	experiences,	can	be	said	to	be	at	the	“centre”	of	the	field	of	experiences,	while	all	the	rest	of	the	experiences	can	be	said	to	be	further	out,	in	some	sense,	at	the	“periphery”.	Here	are	some	representative	examples	of	how	philosophers	and	psychologists	articulate	the	idea	that	the	field	of	experiences	seem	to	have	this	kind	of	structure:	
In	most	of	our	fields	of	consciousness	there	is	a	core	of	sensation	that	is	 very	 pronounced.	 You,	 for	 example,	 now,	 although	 you	 are	 also	thinking	and	feeling,	are	getting	through	your	eyes	sensations	of	my	face	 and	 figure,	 and	 through	your	 ears	 sensations	 of	my	voice.	 The	sensations	 are	 the	 centre	 or	 focus,	 the	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 the	margin,	of	your	actually	present	conscious	field.	(James	1890	p.	18)	
	Perhaps	 the	 best	 general	 description	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 attention	 is	afforded	 by	 Wundt’s	 comparison	 of	 consciousness	 to	 the	 field	 of	vision.	 As	 in	 the	 eye	 there	 is	 a	 point	 of	 clearest	 vision,	 where	 all	impressions	 are	 very	 distinct	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 vagueness	 of	 the	
																																																						9	I	follow	James	(1890)	in	this	use	of	“stream	of	consciousness”	and	Bayne	(2010)	in	this	use	of	“total	conscious	state”.			
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objects	seen	with	other	parts	of	the	retina,	so	in	the	mind	there	are	always	a	few	processes	which	stand	out	clearly	while	the	others	are	blurred	and	indefinite...	Attention	may	wander	over	the	mental	field	as	the	eye	may	wander	over	a	surface	in	the	outside	world.	(Pillsbury	1907	p.	2)	
It	might	be	helpful	 if	 I	were	 to	 give	 some	more	definite	 idea	of	 the	manner	in	which	I	conceive	a	thought	or	an	element	of	consciousness	to	occupy	the	foreground	of	consciousness...	When	speaking	about	an	object	in	the	vicinity	it	is	usually	possible	to	point	to	it.	The	visual	field,	the	auditory	field,	or	whatever	sense-field	it	 is,	 then	organizes	itself	about	the	object.	 It	becomes	the	centre	of	attention.	Very	much	of	a	parallel	situation	is	found,	I	suggest,	in	consciousness	generally.	When	I	 have	 a	 thought,	 for	 instance,	 the	 thought	 becomes	 the	 cognitive	referent	around	which	consciousness	organizes	itself.	(Evans	1970	p.	91)	
…	imagine	you	are	in	a	room	with	dark	gray	walls,	ceiling,	and	floor	and	 a	 single	 source	 of	 dim	overhead	 light.	 In	 that	 room	 is	 sitting	 a	cushion	and	a	small	table.	On	the	table	is	a	steaming	pot	of	tea.	Imagine	that	you	are	sitting	on	the	cushion	facing	the	teapot	with	your	eyes	open,	fixated	on	the	teapot,	breathing	steadily	and	slowly.	To	yield	the	phenomenal	contrast,	imagine	that	you	are	interested	in	observing	the	steam	from	the	pot	of	 tea.	 In	 the	second	version	of	 this	experience,	imagine	 that	 you	 are	 interested	 in	 observing	 your	 breath,	 as	 in	 a	session	 of	 yogic	 meditation….	 I	 suspect	 that	 most	 experience	 the	stimulus	of	 interest	 to	be	 in	 the	 foreground	when	 interested	 in	 the	steam,	and	the	breath	in	the	foreground	when	interested	in	the	breath.	This	is	not	to	say	that	most	people	experience	the	stimulus	of	interest	to	be	in	the	spatial	foreground;	the	stimulus	of	interest	is	experienced	as	though	in	the	foreground	of	the	mind.	(Jennings	2015	p.	1268).	
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As	these	passages	demonstrate,	the	view	that	 it	 is	correct	to	describe	parts	of	the	field	of	consciousness	as	more	central	than	others	is	a	popular	and	enduring	one.		
	 Sebastian	Watzl’s	account	of	the	distinction	between	centre	and	periphery	seems	to	be	 the	most	 extensive	 and	 explicit,	 and	 so	 in	 what	 follows	 I	 will	 work	with	 his	 view	 in	particular	 (his	 account	 is	 developed	 in	Watzl	 2010,	Watzl	 2011a,	Watzl	 2014,	 and	Watzl	2017).	Here	is	what	Watzl	has	to	say	about	what	makes	one	experience	“further”	from	the	centre	of	the	field	of	consciousness	than	another	experience:		 The	 idea	 that	 the	 field	of	 consciousness	has	attentional	 structure	 is	highly	intuitive.	When	I	focus	attention	on	an	itch	there	seems	to	be	a	sense	 in	 which	 the	 itch	 experience	 is	 central	 in	 the	 field	 of	consciousness,	while	 the	 feeling	 of	 elevation,	 the	 experience	 of	 the	jazz,	and	the	experience	of	the	letters	become	a	mere	periphery	to	that	central	experience.	By	contrast,	when	I	start	focusing	on	the	melody	being	played	by	the	saxophone,	 the	 itch	experience	moves	from	the	centre	 to	 the	 fringe	 or	 margin	 of	 my	 field	 of	 consciousness.		(Watzl	2014	p.	65)			So	according	to	Watzl’s	introspective	observations,	when	we	consciously	focus	our	attention	on	one	thing	and	then	another,	what	it	is	like	to	be	us	seems	to	change	in	a	distinctive	and	systematic	way.	Our	experiences	of	what	we	 focus	our	attention	on	seem	to	move	 to	 the	centre	of	the	field	of	experiences,	and	our	experiences	of	many	other	things	that	we	were	already	experiencing	seem	to	move	further	from	the	centre.			 		 To	 put	 things	 a	 bit	 more	 precisely,	 Watzl	 thinks	 that	 a	 particular	 phenomenal	property	–	“being	in	the	centre	of	the	field	of	experiences”	–	is	to	be	explained	with	reference	to	various	instances	of	a	particular	phenomenal	relation	–	the	“peripheral-to”	relation	(Watzl	2014	 p.	 66).	 On	 his	 view,	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 field	 of	 experiences	 is	 the	 experience	 (or	experiences)	 that	 are	 not	 peripheral	 to	 any	 other	 experiences.	 Additionally,	 on	 his	 view,	
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one’s	 “object	 of	 attention”	 is	 the	 object	 that	 the	 experience	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 field	 of	experiences	is	about	(Watzl	2010	p.	150,	2014	p.	67).			Watzl’s	account	of	the	peripheral-to	relation	generates,	therefore,	a	method	of	trying	to	find	out	whether	a	shift	in	a	particular	kind	of	attention	(e.g.	perceptual	or	intellectual)	can	cause	the	structure	of	part	of	the	field	of	experiences	to	change.	The	method	is	this:	you	deliberately	 shift	 the	 direction	 of	 either	 variety	 of	 attention,	 and	 then	 you	 ask	 yourself	questions	 of	 the	 form:	 “Did	 that	 series	 of	 experiences	 reveal	 to	me	 that	 the	 shift	 of	 my	attention	altered	the	structure	of	my	field	of	consciousness?”.	If	“yes”	seems	to	be	the	answer,	one	can	then	move	to	conclusions	of	the	form	“Well	then:	directing	that	kind	of	attention	can	change	the	structure	of	the	field	of	experiences”.		Reflection	on	Watzl’s	case	above	seems	to	generate	the	conclusion	that	perceptual	attention	can	alter	 the	structure	of	 the	perceptual	part	of	 the	 field	of	consciousness.	This	conclusion	 is	 also	 in	 line	 with	 Mole’s	 articulation	 of	 the	 common-sense	 picture	 of	 the	relationship	between	attention	and	consciousness,	which	I	discussed	above.			In	the	next	section,	I	attempt	to	apply	this	methodology	to	answering	my	question	about	intellectual	attention	and	conscious	cognition.	As	we’ll	see,	there’s	a	problem:	on	the	basis	of	introspection,	Michael	Martin	(1997)	and	Ian	Phillips	(2012)	would	answer	“no”,	but	Michael	Maher	(1923)	and	Elijah	Chudnoff	(2013)	would	answer	“yes”.			
	
§2.	Introspecting	on	the	structure	of	conscious	cognition	
		 	If	we	think	of	the	field	of	experiences	as	a	set	of	experiences,	it	is	easy	to	talk	about	parts	of	the	field.	Parts	of	the	field	are	subsets	of	the	set	of	experiences	that	constitutes	the	field.	In	fact,	I’ve	already	mentioned	two	parts	of	the	field	in	this	paper:	the	centre	and	the	periphery.	Another	interesting	part	of	the	field	of	experiences	is	the	cognitive	part	of	the	field	
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–	that	is,	the	part	composed	of	the	experiences	that	you	have	when	you	engage	in	cognitive	activities	like	judging	and	remembering.		We	 should	 expect	 the	 methodology	 I	 discussed	 above	 to	 enable	 us	 to	 answer	questions	about	the	centres	of	parts	of	the	field	of	experiences,	just	as	we	should	expect	it	to	answer	questions	 about	 the	 centre	of	 the	 field	as	a	whole.	Here’s	 the	particular	question	about	a	part	of	the	field	of	experience	that	I’m	interested	in	addressing	in	this	paper:	“Can	the	way	we	direct	our	intellectual	attention	structure	our	cognitive	experiences	into	a	centre	and	a	periphery?	Or	are	all	of	our	cognitive	experiences	equally	central?”.	Note	that	precisely	what	 it	means	 for	 attention	 to	 “structure”	 experience	 into	 a	 centre	 and	 a	 periphery	will	depend	 on	 what	 the	 metaphysical	 relationship	 between	 attention	 and	 consciousness	consists	in.	If	attention	is	something	distinct	from	consciousness	(as	it	is	according	to,	e.g.	Wu	2014)	then	my	question	is	about	the	causal	impact	that	intellectual	attention	can	have	on	consciousness.	 If	attention	is	an	aspect	or	mode	of	consciousness,	 then	my	question	is	about	how	that	aspect	or	mode	of	consciousness	alters	as	we	engage	in	shifts	of	attention.			In	the	rest	of	this	section,	I’ll	review	some	answers	that	philosophers	have	given	to	this	question	on	the	basis	of	introspection	(i.e.,	the	method	suggested	by	Watzl’s	remarks	on	the	centre	and	periphery	of	the	field	of	consciousness).				 Michael	 Martin	 and	 Ian	 Phillips	 have	 given	 introspective	 reports	 in	 favour	 of	 a	negative	answer	to	the	question	of	whether	intellectual	attention	seems	to	alter	the	structure	of	conscious	cognition,	but	their	treatment	of	the	question	was	relatively	brief.	Martin’s	and	Phillips’s	 claim	actually	occurs	within	an	argument	about	a	 separate	debate	–	 the	debate	about	how	best	define	or	otherwise	give	an	account	of	intellectual	attention.	They	think	that	intellectual	 attention	 constitutes	 cognitive	 consciousness,	 while	 perceptual	 attention	
structures	perceptual	consciousness.10		
																																																						10	An	even	deeper	problem	with	their	view	is	that	it	seems	to	rule	out	the	possibility	of	unconscious	intellectual	attention	 from	 the	 start.	 But	 this	 is	 an	 unacceptable	 result,	 given	 the	 widespread	 presumption	 that	 it	 is	intelligible	 to	 search	 for	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 unconscious	 attention	 exists	 –	 see	 e.g.	 Kentridge	 (2011),	Norman,	Heywood,	&	Kentridge	(2013),	and	Mole	(2014).		
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	 This	is	their	argument	in	favour	of	accepting	that	way	of	distinguishing	perceptual	attention	from	intellectual	attention	(Martin	1997	p.	78;	Phillips	2012	p.	288):	(1)	Initial	reflection	on	ordinary	perceptual	experiences	shows	that	it	seems	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	we	 are	 currently	 having	 experience	 of	 a	plenitude	 of	 items	 beyond	 what	 we	 are	 currently	 focusing	 our	attention	on.	(2)	Initial	reflection	on	ordinary	cognitive	experiences	seems	to	show	that	there	is	no	such	array	of	items	for	us	to	shift	our	attention	across.	(3)	Therefore	we	can	distinguish	between	perceptual	and	intellectual	attention	in	the	following	way:	perceptual	attention	is	a	modification	of	the	perceptual	stream	of	consciousness,	but	 intellectual	attention	
just	is	the	cognitive	stream	of	consciousness.	
		 	(1)	is	relatively	uncontroversial.	As	Christopher	Mole	(2008)	argues,	 introspective	reflection	 on	 day-to-day	 perceptual	 experiences	 seems	 to	 reveal	 that	 the	 relationship	between	perceptual	attention	and	perceptual	consciousness	is	as	of	a	spotlight	of	attention	ranging	over	field	of	experiences	of	which	one	is	already	conscious.	Above,	I	used	a	figure	with	three	crosses	to	help	illustrate	Mole’s	point.		 		 But	(2),	I	will	argue,	is	more	controversial	than	Martin	and	Phillips	seem	to	think.	This	is	how	they	describe	what	their	own	conscious	cognition	seems	to	be	like	when	they	argue	in	favour	of	(2):		[P]erceptual	 attention	 seems	 to	 range	 over	 an	 array	 of	 objects	 of	which	we	are	already	aware.	Internal	attention	does	not	range	over	contents,	 some	of	which	were	already	objects	of	 thought…	(Phillips	2012	p.	288).		
	 14	
In	[the	perceptual	case]	it	is	tempting	to	think	of	experience	in	terms	of	a	whole	array	of	items	stretching	beyond	what	I	have	focused	my	attention	on	at	a	time	-	an	array	over	which	I	could	move	my	attention,	as	a	beam	or	a	spotlight.	It	is	as	if	I	am	aware	of	the	whole	array	at	a	time	 ...	whether	 I	now	focus	my	attention	on	one	part	of	 it	or	not	 ...	There	 seems	 to	 be	 no	 corresponding	 array	 of	 items	 to	 shift	 one’s	attention	over	in	thought…	(Martin	1997	p.	78).			So	Martin	and	Phillips	seem	to	think	that	structure	plays	less	of	a	role	in	conscious	cognition.	That	is,	they	seem	endorse	(2)	because	they	think	that	all	of	our	cognitive	experiences	seem	to	be	in	the	focus	of	attention.	On	this	way	of	thinking,	all	of	our	cognitive	experiences	are	equally	central,	and	consequently	shifts	in	attention	would	not	cause	shifts	in	the	way	that	the	peripheral-to	relation	obtains	in	a	given	subject’s	field	of	experiences.				 (2)	would	be	undermined	if	other	theorists	have	come	to	different	conclusions	about	what	cognitive	experience	seems	to	be	like,	and	indeed,	other	theorists	have	come	to	that	kind	of	 conclusion.	 For	 example,	Elijah	Chudnoff	 has	 claimed	 that	 the	phenomenology	of	performing	 a	 geometrical	 proof	 can	 involve	 having	 some	 cognitive	 experiences	 in	 the	foreground	of	consciousness	and	some	in	the	background:		 You	consider	the	proposition	that	circles	are	symmetrical	about	their	diameters...	What	you	do	is	imagine	an	arbitrary	circle,	and	imagine	folding	 it	 over	 various	 chords	 that	 divide	 it	 into	 equal	 parts.	 These	chords	 are	 its	 diameters,	 and	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 your	 imaginative	endeavor	that	the	circle	is	symmetrical	about	them…	In	[this	case]	you	differentiate	 the	property	of	being	a	diameter	 from	 its	background.	This	 background	 consists	 of	 other	properties…	To	 say	 that	 you	 are	thinking	about	all	the	different	sorts	of	chords	on	a	circle	is	not	to	say	that	each	one	stands	out	clearly	before	your	mind.	Only	one	does:	the	diameter	(Chudnoff	2013,	pp.	717-718).	
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On	Chudnoff’s	view,	therefore,	thinking	about	something	does	not	entail	that	it	is	an	object	of	our	intellectual	attention:	 it	might	be	in	the	background	of	cognitive	consciousness.	An	alternative	explanation	of	this	apparent	dispute	between	Martin	and	Phillips	and	Chudnoff	is	that	Chudnoff	is	describing	an	episode	of	visual	imagination,	which	is	not	a	process	that	is	“cognitive”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	Martin	 and	 Phillips	 intended.	 This	 gives	 us	 some	 reason	 to	investigate	the	phenomenology	of	cognitive	processes	that	are	more	obviously	cognitive	in	the	sense	that	they	intended,	as	I	do	below	in	my	discussion	of	the	phenomenology	of	forming	and	maintaining	mental	counts.				 And	here	is	a	second	description	of	the	phenomenology	of	thought	that	problematizes	(2),	from	Michael	Maher’s	book	Psychology:	Empirical	and	Rational:		...	 intellectual	 attention,	 even	 when	 engaged	 in	 comparison,	apprehends	its	objects	in	the	form	of	a	unity	of	some	sort.	The	focus	of	attention	 seems	 to	be	 at	 any	moment	 a	 single	 thought,	 though	 that	thought	 may	 carry	 a	 fringe	 of	 relations	 and	 a	 nucleus	 of	 elements	dimly	felt	to	be	distinct	from	each	other…	(Maher	1923	p.	349).		Maher	 seems	 to	 think	 any	 attentive	 cognitive	 experience	 we	 have	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	“fringe”	which	 is	 felt	 in	a	different	way	 than	 the	 thought	 that	we	are	attending	 to.	And	 it	seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	various	parts	of	this	fringe	are	items	that	we	could	direct	intellectual	 attention	 towards,	 and	 cause	 to	 become	 more	 central	 in	 our	 fields	 of	consciousness.	So	on	Maher’s	way	of	 thinking,	 there	does	 seem	to	be	an	array	of	 items	 in	conscious	thought	that	attention	can	range	over.				 Maher	and	Chudnoff	may	well	be	wrong	about	what	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	thought	is	like.	My	goal	in	quoting	their	introspective	reports	is	just	making	it	evident	that	Martin’s	and	Phillips’s	argument	is	much	more	controversial	than	it	might	first	appear,	and	that	in	fact	there	are	theorists	who	would	dispute	their	claim	about	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	thinking.		
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	 The	 core	 problem	 is	 that	 introspective	 judgments	 about	 how	 to	 characterize	phenomenology	notoriously	vary	from	person	to	person.11	Thus,	these	initial	moves	based	on	introspection	doesn’t	seem	sufficient	to	answer	my	question	about	whether	intellectual	attention	alters	cognitive	consciousness,	or	to	provide	Martin	and	Phillips	adequate	reason	to	 distinguish	 perceptual	 attention	 from	 intellectual	 attention	 in	 the	 way	 that	 they	 do.	Martin’s	and	Phillips’s	argument	for	their	definition	of	intellectual	attention	seems	to	rest	on	the	hope	that	this	particular	introspective	judgment	will	not	be	variable	in	that	way,	but,	as	I’ve	shown,	this	introspective	judgment	is	variable	in	just	that	way.			 For	all	that,	(2)	might	be	true.	One	way	to	make	some	headway	would	be	to	make	some	more	sophisticated	introspective	arguments	–	e.g.,	to	provide	a	debunking	argument	for	the	introspective	 judgments	 of	 either	 Martin	 and	 Phillips	 or	 Maher	 and	 Chudnoff.	 Such	 an	argument	would	provide	an	explanation	of	why	one	of	the	pairs	of	philosophers	is	incorrectly	describing	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 their	 own	 conscious	 cognition.	 	 Another	 potential	way	would	be	to	attempt	to	make	use	of	introspective	data	from	specially	trained	subjects	rather	than	relatively	naïve	subjects.12			 Alternatively,	another	way	to	make	some	progress	on	the	question	of	whether	(2)	is	true	 would	 be	 to	 advert	 to	 some	 behavioral	 or	 neurological	 evidence.	 Behavioral	 or	neurological	evidence	that	there	were	two	modes	of	consciously	thinking	(one	attentive,	the	other	 inattentive)	 would	 lend	 some	 weight	 to	 the	 conclusions	 of	 Maher	 and	 Chudnoff.	Behavioral	 or	 neurological	 evidence	 to	 the	 contrary	 would	 lend	 some	 weight	 to	 the	conclusions	of	Martin	and	Phillips.			 In	the	next	section	of	this	paper,	I	investigate	the	option	of	moving	this	debate	forwards	with	behavioral	evidence.		
																																																						11	See,	e.g.,	Schwitzgebel	(2008)	for	a	vivid	discussion	of	this	point,	as	well	as	a	discussion	of	introspection’s	(un)reliability.			12	See,	e.g.,	Schwitzgebel	(2004)	and	Heavey,	Hurlburt,	and	Lefforge	(2010)	for	discussions	of	what	that	sort	of	training	might	entail.	The	training	 involves	 learning	to	use	specific	 terms	to	describe	what	 it	 is	 like	to	have	various	specific	kinds	of	experiences.			
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§3.	How	to	 find	behavioural	evidence	that	 there	 is	structure	 in	conscious	cognition	
		 I	 think	 it’s	 reasonable	 to	assume	 that	 theorists	 in	both	camps	of	 this	dispute	would	accept	the	claim	that	we	can	consciously	think	of	more	than	one	thing	at	once.	What	Martin	and	Phillips	take	issue	with	is	the	claim	that	in	so	doing	we	could	also	think	attentively	about	one	 of	 them	 and	 inattentively	 about	 the	 other.	 So	 the	 kind	 of	 evidence	 that	 would	 be	compelling	to	Martin	and	Phillips,	or	someone	who	agrees	with	them	about	how	to	describe	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition,	would	be	some	non-introspective	evidence	that	we	can	attentively	think	of	one	thing	while	inattentively	thinking	of	another.	Paired	with	the	assumption	that	it’s	in	virtue	of	the	attentive	mode	of	thought	an	experience	becomes	more	central	in	the	field	of	consciousness	than	others	(which	I	defend	in	the	final	section	of	the	paper),	that	result	would	corroborate	the	introspective	judgments	of	Maher	and	Chudnoff.			 Hugh	 Garavan’s	 paper	 “Serial	 Attention	Within	Working	Memory”	 (1998)	 provides	some	 behavioral	 evidence	 that	 will	 help	 us	 answer	 my	 question.	 In	 Garavan’s	 study,	participants	 formed	 and	 maintained	 two	 counts	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Participants	 were	informed	of	their	two	tasks	-	keeping	count	of	the	triangles	and	rectangles	that	they	saw	-	and	then	exposed	to	one	shape	(a	triangle	or	a	rectangle)	at	a	time.	Participants	controlled	when	they	were	exposed	to	the	next	shape	in	the	series	by	pressing	a	bar	as	soon	as	they	had	updated	their	count	(i.e.,	they	had	control	of	the	“stimulus	onset”	time).	There	were	two	kinds	of	transitions	between	shape-slides	within	the	series	of	shape-slides.	 In	a	 “No	Stimulus	Switch”	 transition,	a	rectangle	 followed	a	rectangle	or	a	 triangle	followed	a	 triangle.	 In	a	 “Stimulus	Switch”	 transition,	a	 rectangle	 followed	a	 triangle	or	a	triangle	followed	a	rectangle.	I’ve	included	my	illustration	of	this	below:	transition	#1	is	a	“No	 Stimulus	 Switch”	 transition,	 while	 transitions	 #2,	 #3,	 and	 #4	 are	 “Stimulus	 Switch”	transitions.	On	my	way	of	speaking,	a	transition	is	the	duration	between	two	stimulus	onset	times.		 	
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			 Garavan	found	 that	participants	took	longer	to	respond	to	two	slides	in	a	“Stimulus	Switch”	transition	than	in	a	“No	Stimulus	Switch”	transition.	His	explanation	of	the	delay	was	that	participants	were	only	able	to	attend	to	one	count	at	a	time,	and	that	in	order	to	update	their	count	in	the	“Stimulus	Switch”	condition,	participants	first	had	to	switch	their	focus	of	attention	to	a	different	count	than	the	one	that	they	were	already	attending	to	(Garavan	1998	p.	271).	Garavan	performed	additional	 experiments	 to	 rule	 out	 other	 perceptual	 explanations	 of	 the	 delay	 -	 e.g.,	 the	explanation	that	the	delay	occurred	because	it	is	easier	to	focus	one’s	gaze	on	two	triangles	consecutively	than	a	triangle	and	then	a	rectangle	(Garavan	1998	pp.	267-268).	In	short,	this	effect	does	not	seem	to	be	a	purely	perceptual	phenomenon,	and	so	our	explanation	of	why	it	occurred	needs	to	advert	to	cognition.				 Garavan	also	argued	that	an	explanation	that	adverted	to	a	shift	in	attention	was	more	plausible	than	one	that	adverted	to	retrieval	from	memory.	As	he	points	out,	over	the	course	of	 the	 study	 participants	would	 verbalize	 both	 of	 their	 counts	 in	 the	 same	 order.	 But	 in	Stimulus	Switch	transitions,	the	delay	persisted	even	when	the	count	that	the	participant	had	to	switch	to	was	the	count	that	they	had	most	recently	rehearsed.	He	has	in	mind,	e.g.,	the	following	sequence	of	events:	the	presentation	of	a	square,	a	participant	verbalizing	their	count	of	squares	and	then	their	count	of	triangles,	the	presentation	of	a	triangle,	and	then	the	participant	verbalizing	their	count	of	squares	and	count	of	triangles.	As	Garavan	notes,	“one	would	expect	the	retrieval	of	[the	most	recently	rehearsed]	count's	current	value	to	be	
Figure	3:	Garavan's	experiment	
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at	 least	as	fast	as,	 if	not	faster	than,	retrieval	of	the	just	updated	count”	(Garavan	1998	p.	273).	But	this	is	not	what	he	observed,	and	the	Stimulus	Switch	delay	persisted	even	when	a	count	had	been	recently	rehearsed.				 But	why	 should	we	 really	 think	 that	 this	 explanation	 should	 advert	 to	 intellectual	
attention	 rather	 than	 some	 other	 non-memorial	 aspect	 of	 cognition?	 This	 brings	 us	 to	challenging	question	of	what	 the	nature	of	attention	really	 is,	and	the	related	question	of	what	counts	as	behavioral	evidence	that	a	participant	has	directed	her	attention	to	one	thing	and	 then	 another.	 See	 Anderson	 2011	 Watzl	 2011b	 for	 discussion	 of	 the	 problem	 of	widespread	 disagreement	 amongst	 psychologists	 and	 philosophers	 about	 how	 to	 define	“attention”.	Anderson’s	concern	that	most	psychologists	studying	attention	are	actually	all	studying	something	different	is	aptly	expressed	in	the	title	of	his	2011	paper,	“There	is	no	such	thing	as	attention”.	And	Garavan,	like	many	psychologists	working	on	attention,	did	not	explicitly	define	 “attention”	 in	his	 article.	 Instead,	he	 seemed	 to	 rely	on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	process	he	was	studying	seemed	to	be	a	paradigm	case	of	intellectual	attention.					 I	agree	with	Garvan’s	assumption,	and	here	will	provide	an	argument	for	it	grounded	in	Wayne	Wu’s	(2014)	analysis	of	the	way	many	psychologists	study	perceptual	attention.	First	I’ll	explain	Wu’s	view	and	how	it	applies	to	the	intellectual	case,	and	then	I’ll	explain	how	we	can	use	his	view	to	defend	the	idea	that	Garavan’s	task	required	shifts	of	intellectual	attention.				 Wu’s	 view	 is	designed	 to	 address	 the	problem	of	 apparent	disagreement	 amongst	psychologists	 about	 what	 perceptual	 attention	 really	 is.	 He	 acknowledges	 that	 many	psychologists	 appear	 to	 define	 “perceptual	 attention”	 differently.	 But,	 he	 argues,	 many	psychologists	seem	to	think	that	when	a	participant	uses	information	from	a	personal	level	perceptual	 representation	 to	 guide	 the	 performance	 of	 some	 task,	 she	 has	 perceptually	attended	to	the	object	that	the	representation	is	about.	This	view	is	based	on	Wu’s	analysis	of	how	a	wide	variety	of	psychologists	make	inferences	about	perceptual	attention,	including	psychologists	 studying	 attention	 via	 the	 visual	 search	 paradigm	 and	 the	 shadowing	paradigm	(Wu	2014	p.	39)		
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		 Wu’s	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 although	 many	 psychologists	 studying	 perceptual	attention	might	appear	 to	 use	 the	word	 “perceptual	 attention”	 in	 different	ways,	 a	 large	group	of	them	are	actually	all	using	the	word	in	the	same	way	when	it	really	matters	(i.e.,	when	drawing	conclusions	about	attention	on	the	basis	of	observed	behavior).	As	Wu	notes,	realizing	 that	 a	 variety	 of	 psychologists	 endorse	 such	 a	 view	about	what	 is	 sufficient	 for	attention	goes	along	with	being	able	 to	explain	why	we	should	resist	 the	skepticism	that	some	psychologists	have	about	the	progress	of	our	collective	study	of	attention.	Moreover,	on	this	way	of	thinking,	there	might	be	both	conscious	and	unconscious	attention:	when	the	representation	 in	 question	 is	 conscious,	 the	 participants’	 use	 of	 information	 would	 be	sufficient	 for	 conscious	 attention,	 and	 when	 the	 representation	 is	 unconscious,	 the	participants’	use	of	information	would	be	sufficient	for	unconscious	attention.13				 Suppose	that	Wu	is	right	about	how	many	psychologists	study	perceptual	attention.	Then	it	would	be	reasonable	to	hypothesize	that	psychologists	studying	intellectual	attention	believe	that	a	similar	kind	of	behaviour	is	sufficient	reason	to	conclude	that	a	participant	has	intellectually	 attended	 to	 an	 object.	 On	 this	 way	 of	 thinking,	 what	 would	 suffice	 for	intellectual	attention	to	an	object	 is	 that	a	subject	uses	 information	from	a	personal	 level	cognitive	representation	of	the	object	to	guide	the	performance	of	a	task.				 The	 way	 that	 psychologists	 study	 intellectual	 attention	 using	 the	 “refreshing	paradigm”	provides	support	 for	 this	hypothesis.	 In	 the	simplest	version	of	 the	refreshing	paradigm,	 subjects	 see	 a	 series	 of	 words	 on	 slides,	 one	 at	 a	 time,	 interspersed	with	 the	occasional	slide	that	displays	a	single	black	dot.	They	are	instructed	to	read	aloud	the	words	that	they	see,	and	to	think	of	(“refresh”)	and	say	the	previous	word	they	saw	when	they	see	
																																																						
13	That	idea	seems	to	make	sense	of	why,	e.g.	Kentridge	(2011),	Norman,	Heywood,	&	Kentridge	(2013),	and	Mole	(2014)	say	that	when	a	subject	uses	information	from	a	representation	of	some	object	but	doesn’t	seem	conscious	of	it,	there	is	evidence	in	favour	of	the	view	that	unconscious	attention	exists.	The	subjects	they	have	in	mind	are	subjects	with	blindsight	using	information	from	representations	of	objects	in	their	blind	fields,	or	sighted	 subjects	 that	 use	 information	 from	 representations	 of	 objects	 that	 are	 “invisible”	 because	 of	 their	rapidly	flickering	boundaries	(see	Mole	2014	p.	45	for	more	on	“invisible”	objects).	
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a	black	dot.	Here	is	an	example	of	what	a	series	of	slides	in	the	refreshing	paradigm	look	like:	
 
 
Figure 1: The refreshing paradigm 
  Psychologists	seem	to	think	that	when	subjects	successfully	respond	to	the	black	dots,	the	subjects	 have	 attended	 to	 the	 previous	 word	 that	 they	 saw.14	 The	 hypothesis	 that	 they	believe	 that	 using	 information	 from	 a	 personal	 level	 and	 cognitive	 representation	 of	 an	object	to	guide	the	performance	of	a	task	seems	to	explain	why	they	make	this	 inference.	That’s	 because	 in	 this	 paradigm,	 subjects	 must	 have	 used	 information	 from	 cognitive	representations	 of	 the	 previous	 word	 they	 had	 seen	 to	 guide	 their	 performance	 of	 the	“respond	to	a	black	dot”	task.				 Psychologists	that	study	intellectual	attention	via	the	refreshing	paradigm,	therefore,	seem	 to	 think	 of	 attention	 in	 just	 the	 way	 that	 Wu	 argued	 that	 psychologists	 studying	perceptual	attention	do.	It’s	also	the	case	that	scientists	working	in	other	paradigms,	like	the	“n-back”	paradigm	and	the	“retro-cue”	paradigm,	appear	to	think	of	intellectual	attention	in	terms	 of	 using	 information	 from	 cognitive	 representations	 to	 guide	 the	 performances	 of	tasks,	but	I	do	not	discuss	those	paradigms	in	this	paper	for	brevity’s	sake	(see	McElree	2006	for	a	look	at	the	n-back	paradigm	and	Astle	et	al.	2012	for	a	look	at	the	retro-cue	paradigm).		
																																																						14	See	Johnson	et	al.	(2002	p.	64)	for	this	task,	and	Johnson	et	al.	(2005	p.	340)	for	the	explicit	assertion	that	‘refreshing’	(which	 is	required	by	responding	to	the	dot)	entails	attention.	For	more	work	in	the	refreshing	paradigm	see,	 e.g.,	Raye	et	 al.	 (2002),	Chen	&	Cowan	 (2009),	Higgins	&	 Johnson	 (2009),	 and	 Johnson	et	 al.	(2013).			
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		 Now	I’ll	argue	that	if	we	use	this	view	about	what’s	sufficient	for	intellectual	attention	to	analyze	the	methodology	in	Garvan’s	study	of	mental	counting,	we	get	the	result	that	we	should	 expect:	 in	Garavan’s	 study,	 participants	 had	 to	 switch	 their	 conscious	 intellectual	attention	from	one	count	to	another	throughout	his	experiment.				 First,	note	that	in	this	experiment,	participants	working	through	the	two	slides	of	a	Stimulus	Switch	transition	had	to	use	 information	 from	one	cognitive	representation	of	a	count	 and	 then	 another	 cognitive	 representation	 of	 a	 count	 in	 order	 to	 guide	 their	performances	of	their	two	counting	tasks.	The	reason	that	the	representations	in	question	seem	 cognitive	 is	 because	 their	 existence	 is	 doesn’t	 actively	 depend	 on	 any	 particular	stimulus	–	indeed,	the	point	of	these	representations	is	to	track	information	about	several	stimuli	 that	 are	 only	 ever	 briefly	 perceptually	 available	 (and	 some	 that	 are	 never	perceptually	available	–	the	counts	themselves).			 		 Second,	note	that	participants	working	through	the	two	slides	of	a	Stimulus	Switch	transition	had	 to	use	 information	 from	one	conscious	representation	of	a	count	and	 then	another	conscious	representation	of	a	count	in	order	to	guide	their	performances	of	their	two	counting	tasks.	The	representations	in	question	seem	conscious	because,	throughout	the	procedure,	as	participants	updated	any	individual	count,	they	verbally	reported	the	current	values	of	both	counts:		“As	 previously	 described	 for	 Experiment	 1,	 when	 asked	 to	 count	aloud,	all	subjects	adopted	the	technique	of	verbalizing	both	counts	following	each	 figure,	 that	 is,	 subjects	would	update	one	 count	 and	rehearse	the	current	value	of	the	other	count.	For	convenience,	these	different	operations	will	be	referred	to	as	“updating”	and	“rehearsing.”	(Garavan	1998	p.	10)		I	 take	 this	 kind	 of	 capacity	 to	 describe	 some	 of	 the	 content	 of	 a	 representation	 via	introspection	to	be	a	good	(although	defeasible)	reason	to	think	that	the	representation	in	
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question	is	a	conscious	one.	It	seems	phenomenologically	implausible	to	suggest	that	while	verbally	reporting	on	their	counts	the	participants	were	using	unconscious	representations	to	guide	their	actions,	in	the	way	that	a	person	with	blindsight,	forced	to	guess	about	where	a	nearby	object	 is	 located,	uses	 information	 from	an	unconscious	representation	to	guide	their	actions.	When	we	form	and	update	two	mental	counts	at	once,	it	does	not	feel	like	we	are	being	guided	by	an	unconscious	state	or	retrieving	something	from	memory.				 But	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 press	 this	 point:	 after	 all,	 even	 if	 it	 seems	 as	 though	we	 are	conscious	of	both	counts	 throughout,	we	might	be	mistaken	about	 that.	 	Perhaps,	 in	 fact,	participants	are	only	ever	conscious	of	the	count	that	they	are	updating,	and	that	the	count	that	they	are	not	updating	is	stored	in	memory	and	consequently	unconscious.	If	might	be	argued	that	one	count	“moves”	to	long	term	memory	and	thereby	becomes	unconscious.			 However,	 the	 example	 of	 H.M.,	 a	 famous	 patient	 in	 the	 history	 of	 psychology	 and	neuroscience,	suggests	otherwise.	As	a	result	of	a	lesion,	H.M	lost	the	capacity	to	form	new	long-term	memories,	but	retained	the	capacity	to	acquire	new	skills	and	engage	in	day-to-day	tasks.	Crucially,	the	day-to-day	tasks	he	was	able	to	perform	seem	to	include	tasks	that	are	very	much	like	the	mental	counting	task	at	issue	in	Garavan’s	study	–	see	this	passage	from	Larry	Squire’s	paper	“The	Legacy	of	Patient	H.M.	for	Neuroscience”:		
“A	key	additional	finding	was	that	H.M.	had	a	remarkable	capacity	for	sustained	attention,	 including	 the	ability	 to	retain	 information	 for	a	period	 of	 time	 after	 it	 was	 presented.	 Thus,	 he	 could	 carry	 on	 a	conversation,	and	he	exhibited	an	intact	digit	span	(i.e.,	the	ability	to	repeat	 back	 a	 string	 of	 six	 or	 seven	 digits).	 Indeed,	 information	remained	 available	 so	 long	 as	 it	 could	 be	 actively	 maintained	 by	rehearsal…	In	contrast,	when	the	material	was	not	easy	to	rehearse	(in	the	 case	 of	 nonverbal	 stimuli	 like	 faces	 or	 designs),	 information	slipped	away	in	less	than	a	minute.”	(Squire	2009	p.	7)	
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What	H.M.’s	 capacities	 suggests	 is	 that	 the	 rehearsal	 strategy	 that	Garavan’s	participants	engaged	in	was	not	a	strategy	that	was	enabled	by	the	use	of	storing	a	count	in	long-term	memory.	As	Squire	notes,	it	seems	like	in	H.M.	long-term	memory	was	damaged	but	what	William	 James	 called	 “primary	 memory”	 was	 preserved,	 and	 that	 H.M.’s	 use	 of	 primary	memory	 is	 what	 explains	 his	 success	 in	 performing	 day	 to	 day	 tasks	 like	 carrying	 on	 a	conversation	 or	 rehearsing	 some	 digits.	 James	 said	 that	 information	 presented	 to	 us	 via	primary	memory	“comes	to	us	as	belonging	to	the	rearward	portion	of	the	present	space	of	time,	and	not	to	the	genuine	past”,	whereas	“secondary	memory	is	quite	different.		An	object	which	has	been	recollected	is	one	which	has	been	absent	from	consciousness	altogether,	and	now	revives	anew.	 It	 is	brought	back,	recalled,	 fished	up,	so	to	speak,	 from	a	reservoir	 in	which,	with	countless	other	objects,	it	lay	buried	and	lost	from	view”.	(James,	1890,	p.	647-648).			 These	 two	 points,	 combined	 with	 Garavan’s	 observation	 that	 Stimulus	 Switch	transitions	 took	more	 time	 than	no	 stimulus	 switch	 transitions,	 show	 that	during	 such	 a	moment,	 the	participants	were	 consciously	 thinking	of	 both	 counts,	 but	 only	 consciously	attending	 to	 one	 of	 the	 counts.	 Paired	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 attention	 structures	consciousness	into	a	centre	and	periphery	(which	I	defend	in	the	next	section	of	the	paper),	we	get	 the	result	 that	 the	peripheral-to	relation	can	obtain	 in	conscious	cognition,	contra	Martin’s	and	Phillips’s	descriptions	of	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition.			
§5.	Do	shifts	in	conscious	attention	always	accompany	structural	change?	
		 As	I’ve	remarked	a	few	times	above,	I’ve	assumed	that	shifts	in	attention	come	along	with	alterations	to	the	structure	of	consciousness.	Someone	with	intuitions	like	Martin’s	and	Phillips’s	could	maintain	their	view	of	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition	through	arguing	 that	 although	 we	 can	 consciously	 and	 attentively	 think	 of	 one	 thing	 while	consciously	and	 inattentively	 thinking	of	another,	 it’s	not	 the	case	 that	shifts	 in	attention	necessarily	cause	one	experience	to	become	more	central	than	another	one.	So	far,	in	this	paper	I’ve	only	provided	an	argument	for	the	former	claim,	and	not	the	latter	one.		
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	 		 As	we	saw	earlier	in	the	paper,	the	latter	claim	is	widely	endorsed	by	many	theorists	that	talk	about	attention.	Early	psychologists	like	William	James	and	David	Pillsbury,	and	a	variety	of	philosophers	including	Cedric	Owen	Evans,	Sebastian	Watzl,	and	Carolyn	Jennings,	have	all	claimed	that	(i)	shifts	in	conscious	attention	seems	to	alter	consciousness	and	that	(ii)	 the	 language	of	 centrality	 should	be	used	 to	characterize	 this	alteration.	Their	 claims	seem	grounded	in	introspection,	and	I	agree	with	them	about	the	introspective	verdict	here.			 		 These	claims	are	not,	however,	undisputed.	Wayne	Wu,	for	example,	has	this	to	say	about	the	phenomenal	effects	of	conscious	attention:			In	 discussing	 phenomenal	 salience,	 I	 suggested	 that	 the	phenomenology	of	attention	is	a	product	of	very	special	cases	where	one	reflects	on	attention	and	its	targets.	In	reflecting	in	this	way,	one	focuses	 on	 the	 targets,	 although	 in	 a	 way	 that	 need	 not	 involve	 a	change	in	the	phenomenology	of	experience	per	se...	Watzl	might	be	right	that	there	is	something	like	a	center-periphery	structure,	but	I	claim	that	this	is	a	reflection	of	special	cases.	Alternatively,	Watzl	can	claim	 that	 I	 have	 simply	missed	 a	 common	 structural	 feature	 of	 all	perceptual	experiences	where	attention	is	differentially	deployed.	At	this	point,	the	debate	mirrors	something	like	the	exchange	between	James	 and	 Fechner,	 a	 difference	 in	 basic	 intuitions	 about	 the	phenomenology	of	attention.	The	challenge	then	is	how	to	resolve	the	impasse	 when	 one	 hits	 rock-bottom	 disagreements	 about	 how	consciousness	seems	to	be.	(Wu	2014	p.	130).				 On	Wu’s	 view,	 attention	 only	 sometimes	 results	 in	 phenomenal	 changes,	 and	 the	language	 of	 centrality	 is	not	 the	 right	 language	 to	 characterize	 the	 changes	 that	 shifts	 in	attention	sometimes	do	explain.	As	Wu	notes,	 it	 is	difficult	to	know	how	to	resolve	“rock-bottom	disagreements”	like	this	one.		
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	 That	 being	 said,	 I	 think	 that	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 think	 that	Wu’s	 description	 of	 the	phenomenology	of	attention	is	something	of	an	anomaly,	and	to	side	with	theorists	on	the	other	side	of	this	dispute	–	theorists	like	William	James,	David	Pillsbury,	Cedric	Owen	Evans,	Sebastian	Watzl,	 and	 Carolyn	 Jennings,	 who	 all	 seem	 to	 describe	 the	 phenomenology	 of	attention	in	convergent	ways.			 Moreover,	the	fact	that	Wu	is	such	an	outlier	is	not	the	only	reason	to	side	with	James,	Pillsbury,	Evans,	Watzl,	and	Jennings	It	also	seems	epistemically	significant	that	this	range	of	theorists,	from	a	wide	array	of	differing	intellectual	vantage	points	–	i.e.,	from	a	wide	range	of	 times,	 places,	 and	 theoretical	 backgrounds	 –	 have	 described	 the	 phenomenology	 of	attention	 in	such	strikingly	similar	ways.	 	The	 tendency	 to	describe	attention	 in	 terms	of	centrality	and	peripherality,	or	equivalent	terms,	seems	to	be	one	that	endures	while	time,	place,	and	theoretical	background	vary,	and	most	charitable	explanation	of	that	convergence	is	 that	 these	 theorists	 are	 just	 getting	 at	 something	 right	 about	 the	 phenomenology	 of	attention.			 Finally,	 while	 intuitive	 descriptions	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 perceptual	 attention	 on	consciousness	 are	 more	 common	 than	 intuitive	 descriptions	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 intellectual	attention	on	consciousness,	it	would	be	surprising	if	attention	turned	out	to	have	radically	different	 effects	 on	 the	 centrality	 of	 a	 cognitive	 experience	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 perceptual	experience.	 The	 field	 of	 consciousness	 is	 composed	 of	 both	 perceptual	 and	 cognitive	experiences,	and	attention	seems	to	make	experiences	more	central	in	the	field	as	a	whole	rather	 than	more	central	 just	with	respect	 to	experiences	of	 the	same	variety	 (cognitive	or	perceptual).		
§6.	Conclusion	
	 In	this	paper,	I’ve	made	some	headway	on	the	question	of	what,	in	various	contexts,	occupies	the	centre	of	a	field	of	experiences.	In	so	doing,	I’ve	shown	that	understanding	the	notion	of	the	“centre”	of	a	field	of	experiences	in	purely	introspective	terms	leads	to	some	methodological	 troubles.	 Then	 I	 used	 some	 behavioral	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 one	way	 of	
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answering	 the	 question.	 As	 I’ve	 pointed	 out	 above,	 there	 remain	 a	 variety	 of	 open	 and	interesting	questions	about	the	ways	that	intellectual	attention	and	cognitive	consciousness	interact.	For	example,	is	there	a	cognitive	analogue	to	James’s	and	Fechner’s	question	about	whether	perceptual	attention	alters	perceptual	consciousness	in	a	non-structural	sense?	And	if	so,	how	should	we	answer	it?		Moreover,	 in	 investigating	 whether	 cognitive	 experience	 is	 structured	 into	foreground	and	background,	I’ve	only	begun	the	investigation	into	all	the	ways	it	might	be	structured:	according	to	James’s	introspective	observations,	attention	structures	our	fields	of	 consciousness	 in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 ways	 other	 than	 “foreground	 and	 background”	including,	 for	example,	 “accent	and	emphasis,	 light	and	shade”.	(James	1890	p.	402).	This	paper	 provides	 a	 foundation	 for	 the	 investigation	 of	 further	 questions	 about	 accent,	emphasis,	light,	and	shade	in	conscious	cognition	that	are	suggested	by	James’s	remarks,	as	well	for	doing	the	conceptual	work	required	to	fully	understand	the	additional	ways	in	which	his	 remarks	suggest	 that	 there	 is	more	 to	phenomenal	 structure	 than	 the	 “peripheral-to”	relation.		
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